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Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to unravel one of the still veiled mysteries 
about the prison system; the daily cost of one prisoner is about 1,300–1,400 yen. 
Most inmates work about eight hours every day. Calculating their hourly pay, 
based on the minimum wage (usually about 800 yen), they can earn 6,400 yen 
(800 yen × 8 h) per a day. In short, they should be able to cover their expenses 
(1,300–1,400 yen) with the “money” they can earn. Nevertheless, the prison 
system claims to “spend a lot of tax money” for living expenses. In doing so, the 
prison, previously known as a market failure, can be shown to be the government’s 
failure. 
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要旨：本稿の目的は、未だベールに包まれている刑務所に関する「謎」を解明するこ
とである。受刑者 1 人／1 日のコストは、1300～1400 円程度である。それに対し、受
刑者はほぼ毎日 8 時間働いている。時給 800 円で単純計算すると、彼らは毎日 6400 円
（800 円×8 時間）を稼いでいる。つまり、彼らが稼いだ「お金」（6400 円）で、彼らの
コスト（1300～1400 円）を賄うこともできるはずである。にもかかわらず、実際は、
彼らは「税金を使いまくっている」。なぜなのか。この疑問への検討によって、これま
で「市場の失敗」と捉えられてきた問題が、「政府の失敗」にもなりかねないことが明
らかになる。 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this essay is to unravel one of the still veiled mysteries about the prison 
system. 
  As will be shown below, the daily cost of one prisoner is about 1,300–1,400 yen. 
Most inmates work about eight hours every day. Calculating their hourly pay, based on 
the minimum wage in each prefecture (usually about 800 yen), they can earn 6,400 yen 
(800 yen × 8 h) daily. In short, they should be able to cover their expenses (1,300–1,400 
yen) with the “money” they can earn. Nevertheless, the prison system claims to “spend 
a lot of the tax money” for living expenses. Why? 
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  I shall try to solve this mystery by adopting Steve D. Levit's research method: to 
“answer interesting questions” by using the tools of economics.[1] In doing so, the prison, 
previously known as a market failure, can be shown to be “the government’s failure.”[2] 
These are the issues to be addressed in this paper. 
  The organization of this paper is as follows: 
Section 1: How much does one prisoner cost? 
Section 2: What is penal labor? 
Section 3: Inconsistencies 
Section 4: Why does the recidivism rate not go down? 
Conclusion: A review of the points covered in this paper 
 
1. How Much Does One Prisoner Cost? 
 
food expenses 570
clothing expenses 40
others 10
bounty (wage) 40
travel expenses (escort expenses 60
medical expenses 110
educational expenses (lecture fee 20
expenses for appliances and supp 130
fuel expenses 90
light、heating and water utility cos 240
Source) Toshio Sakamot(2007), p.85.
Figure-1 the daily cost of one prisoner (unit: yen)
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For use as the premise, we will look at the cost of one prisoner. 
  Of the many materials available in relation to this cost, I will introduce one of the 
reliable sources, the “Prisoner Treatment Readout.”[3] According to the Readout, the 
27 
 
expenses required for all detainees in the 2008 budget (corrective detention expenses, 
矯正収容費) totaled approximately 536,588,550,000 yen. In addition, the average cost 
per prisoner per day is 1,367 yen. The breakdown of costs is shown below (See Figure-1 
too): 
1. Food: 524 yen 
2. Utilities (light, heating, and water): 304 yen 
3. Supplies: 208 yen 
4. Medical expenses and so on: 102 yen 
It would follow that if prisoners earn sufficient money through prison work, the jail 
can be managed with the money they earn. However, as mentioned above, a huge tax 
(about 50 billion yen) has been assigned. Why? 
In the next section, we will examine this question more minutely by looking at penal 
labor, the largest source of income for prisons. 
 
2. What is Penal Labor? 
“Penal labor” (inmates’ work) is the prison’s principal source of income.[4] The website 
of the Ministry of Justice explains penal labor as follows.[5] 
 With regard to penal labor, as of March 2016, labor has been conducted at 77 penal 
institutions (prisons, juvenile prisons, and detention centers), employing 
approximately 48,000 people. In addition to prisoners who are employed as 
prescribed work under the Penal Code (Article 12, Paragraph 2), there are detainees 
obliged to work as a condition of their sentencing. 
 The types of work assigned to prisoners include woodworking, printing, 
dressmaking, and metal and leather working (Figure-2), according to the aptitude of 
each person. 
 There are four types of penal work: 
1. Production work [生産作業], 
2. Social contribution work [社会貢献作業], 
3. Vocational training [職業訓練], and 
4. Self-employment work [自営作業]. 
 
28 
        
Figure-2 penal labor
 Source) Sotoyama Hitomi (2013), p. 55.
 
The government contracts this work with private companies, and all income 
generated by this work is assigned to the state treasury. The income from this work in 
fiscal year 2015 was approximately four billion yen. Contract wages are determined by 
the contractors under consultation and based on the minimum wage of each prefecture 
(approximately 800 yen), the skill level of workers, work content, specificities of penal 
labor, and so on. 
The working hours of the inmates are determined not to exceed 8 hours per day 
(Table-1), in principle, including time for correctional instruction. A payment in 
recognition of the work is awarded to the prisoner at the time of release, in principle. 
The average monthly amount of such work awards, in 2015, was 5,317 yen. 
For penal work, various benefits are listed, as follows: 
 “Criminal work is a national project, hence you can trust us.” 
 “You can always procure a certain amount of labor.” 
 “There is no need for infrastructure costs, such as warehouses. As a result, you save 
on direct expenses.” 
hour min
get out of bed 6 40
check up 6 45
breakfast 7 00
start work 7 30
rest 9 50
work 10 00
lunch 11 50
start work 12 20
rest 14 50
work 15 00
finish work 16 10
dinner 16 20
check up 16 40
leisure 17 00
go to bed 21 00
Table-1　life in prison
Source) Sotoyama Hitomi (2013).,
p.36．
, 
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 “You can manage information thoroughly.” 
 “There are no employee welfare-related expenses.” 
 “Technical instructors are available.” 
The entity responsible for the work is the Corrections Association, who receives 
orders from companies or customers, purchases necessary raw materials, and consigns 
production.[6] CAPIC (the Correctional Association Prison Industry Cooperation) 
produces and sells prison goods under the umbrella of the Corrections Association. The 
products are sold to general companies and customers. A “processing fee” is remitted to 
the national treasury. The remaining income is used for the next raw material purchase 
as well as operating expenses.  
The above outlines the system of penal work. Using this as a reference, we can 
examine why earnings cannot cover the individual expenses of about 1,300–1,400 yen 
per person, even though most inmates working almost 8 hours every day. 
 
3. Inconsistencies  
In this section, we will address the question: “Why is the jail not able to run on the 
money prisoners are paid for their work?” 
As mentioned previously, contract wages are decided by the contractors under 
consultation and based on the minimum wage of each prefecture (approximately 800 
yen) and so on. However, the actual hourly pay is only about 300 yen at the highest.[7] 
Furthermore, the ratio of production income in comparison with total income has fallen 
to 14% since 1987.[8] 
With regard to penal work, “requests for production cuts are dropping under the 
impact of the first oil shock in 1973” (Table-2).[9] As a result, in 1977, self-production 
system (CAPIC) was introduced in anticipation of non-employment[10]. Meanwhile, a 
change occurred with regard to “service labor.” Service labor for private enterprise 
(14% + self-production, meaning CAPIC got 86%) emerged. Only 14% (actually less 
than 14%) would “certainly” be its earnings, went back to the prison system. 
Moreover, as there was a “limitation”— that a “contract for the use of penal labor is 
limited to one company in one industry nationwide,” that ratio never increased again.[11]  
30 
number person
1974 290 5,269 first oil crisis
1975 150 2,277 regression
1976 196 3,850
1977 219 4,015
1978 136 2,453
1979 142 2,599 second oil crisis
1980 203 3,043 regression
1981 250 4,023 regression
1982 236 4,123 regression
1983 121 1,818
1984 128 2,785
1985 111 2,480 recession caused by the strong yen
1986 214 3,445
1987 131 2,018 recession caused by the strong yen
Source)Yoshihide Ono (2009), p. 600.
Table-2 the number of penal labor
yeer
sum
notescancellationreduction
 
year 2018 2017
inventory 1,316,718,086 1,275,479,951
Table-3  transition of inventory (unit: yen)
Source) made by the author based on CAPIC
Honepage （http://www.kyousei-k.gr.jp/）.
 
5,206,303
Cost of materials 3,464,419
Payment to the national
treasury: 1,018,822
Remuneration and benefits for
executives and staff 465,520
revenue
Table-4 revenue and expenditure (unit: 1,000 yen)
expenditure
Source) made by the author based on CAPIC Honepage
（http://www.kyousei-k.gr.jp/）.
 
Of course, if the “self-sales” business had been successful, there would have been 
no problem securing sufficient earnings, but sales did not go well, for the following 
reasons: [12] 
1. The goods were inferior to products made by professional craftsmen; 
2. The price was high; and 
3. CAPIC did not actively promote the goods. 
Thus, their sales were unsuccessful; sales of products made in prisons across the 
country continued to fall, up to the present time. They fell by almost half—from 81 
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billion yen to 45 billion yen.[13] For this reason, as can be confirmed in Table-3, only the 
value of inventory increased, although it is unclear how unit prices are calculated. 
According to Table 4, the profits (5 billion yen) were used as follows: 
1. Cost of materials: 3.5 billion yen, 
2. Payment to the national treasury: 1 billion yen, and 
3. Remuneration and benefits for executives and staff: 0.5 billion yen. 
In summary, most of the revenue evaporated (i.e., was used) for materials, at an 
amount considered extremely high “under the condition of the de facto monopoly of the 
Correctional Association.”[14] The amount for staff salaries and benefits represents about 
110 employees with an average salary of 7 million yen.[15] Thus, only a small sum (1 
billion yen) was remitted to the national treasury.[16] These data reflect the reason that it 
was not possible to cover the corrective detention expenses (about 54 billion yen) with 
funds from jail work revenue (only 1 billion yen). The taxes are being spent on running 
the prisons. 
 
4. Why Does the Recidivism Rate Not Go Down? 
This section addresses another problem not previously examined: “Why does penal 
work not result in enhancing the inmates’ smooth rehabilitation?” 
As is well known, “prisoners’ work is an important treatment measure meant to 
improve the inmates’ rehabilitation,” but such an objective has not been achieved at all. 
Why? The primary problem with inmates’ work has been described as follows: “Works 
that are useful for their resocialization, [...] Um… Nothing! Nothing!”[17] Of course, 
prisons have various production plants—metalworking, paper products processing, 
printing, shoemaking—that offer “the pleasure of being involved in complicated and 
advanced tasks.”[18] However, the reality is that prisoners do not have the right to choose 
the type of work, and further, only simple tasks (for example, paper folding) are 
available, generally called homework. As a result, the work is far from being “an 
important treatment measure that can return them to society smoothly.”  
Moreover, the poor reward for their work is another reason it does not contribute to 
the resocialization of prisoners. The real wage is “about 700 yen per month; even if you 
work desperately for one year, you will get only about 24,000 yen per year as your 
reward.” (Table-5) [19] 
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grade base amount(yen)
1 grade → 41.9
2 grade → 33.1
3 grade → 26.7
4 grade → 22.1
5 grade → 17.7
6 grade → 15.8
7 grade → 12.2
8 grade → 9.7
9 grade → 7.4
10 grade → 5.9
Table-5 base amount  by grade
 (hourly pay)
Source) Toshio Sakamoto (2007),
p.52.
 
Therefore, “When discharged from prison, a prisoner receives a modest 
reward—20,000 yen to 30,000 yen.” Initially, “he thinks that he will never go to jail 
again, that he will not commit a crime. But after being out in society, everything seems 
to go wrong. Why? Because he has no money and no skill [...] Finally, he has no choice 
but to go back to prison, so he commits offenses again.” These cases are “every day, 
many times a day.” Specifically, “The ratio of the number of repeat offenders arrested in 
2006 was 40-50%. Moreover, the ratio has been increasing in recent years.”[20] 
In short, 1) small “incentive remuneration” resulted from restrictions, such as “one 
company one business,” the “poor sales of goods due to lack of PR,” expensive 
materials, and high staff salaries; and 2) most prison jobs are unskilled work leading to a 
high recidivism rate.[21] 
 
Conclusion 
To summarize, these points are clarified in this paper: 
The answers to the question “Why are taxes imposed on prison operations?” are 
these: 
1. The hourly salary of prison work is only about 300 yen. 
2. Labor supply to private companies is only 14%. 
3. Sales of goods are sluggish due to high prices and the lack of promoting them. 
4. Most revenue is diverted to staff salaries and the cost of materials. 
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In addition, the recidivism rate does not decline, due to poor remuneration and 
failure to provide training of practical skills, thus, penal work has hardly helped 
prisoners’ reintegration into society. 
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